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Abstract
This paper estimates the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian lo-
cal governments. We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by
central government auditors. The identification strategy is based on an institutional rule of state
judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned to the most pop-
ulous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research design exploits this
rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identical population
size from other districts in the same state where they are not the most populous. Instrumental
variable estimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with ir-
regularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent. The effect is concentrated among
first-term mayors, suggesting that judicial presence operates through an increased probability of
detection and prosecution rather than an increased probability of conviction, which should disci-
pline second-term mayors as well.
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1 Introduction
Judicial checks on executive (and legislative) power are enshrined in constitutions around the
world. Cross-country comparisons have shown that higher judicial independence is positively cor-
related with measures of political and economic freedom (La Porta et al., 2004), while the results
for economic growth are mixed (Feld and Voigt, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004).1 Evidence from state
governments in the U.S. suggests that corruption is generally lower in states with higher judicial in-
dependence, as measured by whether state supreme court judges are elected rather than appointed
for example (Alt and Lassen, 2008; Cordis, 2009). As is well known, however, the survey and cor-
ruption convictions data used in these studies reflect at least in part variation in enforcement across
states (Alt and Lassen, 2014). Moreover, measuring judicial independence is inherently difficult
(Ríos-Figueroa and Staton, 2013) and identification is generally challenging because institutional
variation often reflects a collective choice.
This paper provides evidence on the role of the territorial organization of the judiciary in con-
straining rent extraction by the local (municipal) executive power in Brazil.2 Rather than evalu-
ating judiciary independence as in existing studies, we focus instead on the conceptually simpler
physical presence of state judicial institutions in the local community.3 State-level prosecutors
and judges provide the checks on local officials within their entire jurisdictions but they are not
physically present in each municipality. Less than half of all municipalities in Brazil have a local
judicial presence and if they do it is a permanent feature of the local institutional environment,
rather than a policy that shifts with prevailing political winds. We use detailed knowledge about
the institutional design of state judiciary systems across Brazil to identify the causal effect of state
judicial presence on rent extraction by local government officials.4
1Feld and Voigt (2003) construct an index of de facto judicial independence using expert surveys, which turns out to
be positively correlated with economic growth, while de iure judicial independence is not. Glaeser et al. (2004) measure
independence of the judiciary based on term-length of judges and find no relationship with economic growth. Whether
institutions that constrain executive power more generally are beneficial for economic development is unclear. For the view
that constraints on the executive cause economic growth see the work of Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall
and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) among others.
For the alternative view that economic growth causes institutional improvement see Barro (1999), Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub and Limongi (2000), Glaeser, La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), Przeworski (2004a, 2004b) and
Glaeser and Saks (2006). Pande and Udry (2005) provide a comprehensive survey of the entire literature on institutions
and development.
2Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil (below the federal and state governments). The discussion
refers to municipalities, counties, communities, local governments, or "the local level" interchangeably.
3For simplicity we refer to "state judicial presence", "local judicial presence" or simply "judicial presence", rather than
"physical presence of state judicial institutions at the local level".
4In our context, local legislators play a minor role compared to the local executive (mayors and program administrators).
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Theoretically, we think of judicial presence as a factor that deters rent extraction by local in-
cumbent politicians and public servants through increased odds of detection and prosecution.5
Local officials might be exposed to a higher probability of detection in counties with local judicial
presence compared to counties without such presence because the general public faces lower trans-
action costs to report irregularities in local public service delivery. In line with this argument, we
estimate that judicial presence reduces the travel distance from the municipality town hall to the
judiciary seat by about 40 kilometers on average. Similarly, local officials may perceive a higher
probability of punishment when the state prosecutor lives in town because he is more familiar with
the setting and faces lower transaction costs for his investigations.6 Alternatively however, local
elites might also find it easier to capture state judiciary officials when they reside in the same mu-
nicipality, which would presumably lower the probability of punishment and increase the incidence
of infractions.7 The effect of judicial presence on rent extraction by local public agents may thus
work through several channels, and the net effect is a priori ambiguous.
We address potential endogeneity of local judicial presence by exploiting a common institu-
tional feature across state judiciary systems that is mandated by federal law: although state judi-
ciary branches provide services to all counties in a given state, only those counties that are suf-
ficiently large in terms of observable characteristics may become a judiciary district (comarca in
Portuguese) by themselves and get a physical presence of judges and prosecutors.8 This territorial
organization in terms of districts is an institutional feature of state judiciary systems only—unique
and distinct from the territorial organization of local and state governments. State-level laws spec-
ify necessary—although not sufficient—conditions for the creation of judiciary districts in terms
of population size and typically a subset of other characteristics, such as geographical area, size
of the electorate, county fiscal revenue, judicial caseload, and the existence of facilities for the
courthouse, prison, police quarters and residence of the judge and prosecutor. Roughly 75 percent
5See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for formal models that typically yield the prediction that equilibrium rents, defined as
private gains from holding office, are decreasing in transaction costs.
6Unfortunately, information on prosecutions from the 26 state judiciary branches is not readily available for outside
researchers, and in fact not even for the central government. It is not clear what we could learn from comparing prosecutions
across counties even if we had access to these data, however, since prosecutions are endogenously determined. For example,
if judicial presence increases the perceived probability of prosecution, local managers and politicians would commit fewer
infractions and as a result there would be fewer prosecutions in counties with judicial presence, not more.
7See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) for the trade-off between local information and capture under centralized vs.
decentralized delivery of public services. See Stigler (1971) on state capture by interest groups.
8Lei Complementar No 35, de 14 de Março de 1979, Art. 95-97.
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of all counties do not become their own judiciary district. These counties are grouped together
with contiguous neighbors, and only one of them becomes the local judiciary seat (sede da co-
marca) and gets the physical presence of the judicial apparatus. New judiciary district formation
is typically accompanied by municipality splitting and tends to respect prior district boundaries.
Although state laws usually do not specify how to select the seat in multi-county judiciary districts,
the internally used assignment rule is to locate the seat in the most populous county because this
minimizes transaction costs to access judicial services for citizens.9
Our research design exploits this rule by using as an instrument for local judicial presence
an indicator for whether or not a county has the highest population in its judiciary district. Es-
sentially, our reduced form compares counties that are largest in their district to counties with
identical population size from other districts in the same state where they are not the most pop-
ulous. Since new district formation is constrained by contiguity requirements typically within
prior district boundaries, the potential for selective groupings of municipalities is limited in prac-
tice. Moreover, since within-district population rank does not guarantee judicial presence, any
potential lobbying is likely about becoming the seat county directly, rather than about having top
population rank within the district. Our instrumental variable (IV) approach explicitly allows for
the possibility that judicial presence is endogenous—even conditional on population—since we
only use variation in judicial presence induced by district-specific population rank. More formally,
the approach relies on three main identifying assumptions. First, conditional on population, dis-
trict maximum population must be mean independent of unobserved factors that affect outcomes
(conditional independence). Second, district maximum population can affect rent extraction only
through local judicial presence, not through other channels (exclusion restriction). Third, the prob-
ability of having a judiciary presence in the municipality must be higher when the municipality is
largest within its district, conditional on population (first stage). In Section 3 we discuss how we
test these assumptions (to the extent this is possible with our data).
Our measure of rent extraction in local governments is based on audit reports stemming from a
policy of randomly selecting Brazilian municipalities for an inspection of federal transfers, which
we refer to as the random audits program. In contrast to survey- or convictions-based corruption
9This information is based on private correspondence with judges and technical judiciary staff in various states.
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measures used in prior work on judicial independence, our outcome measures are not mechani-
cally higher in places where local enforcement efforts are high. Following the terminology of the
federal internal audit agency (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU), we usually refer to the infrac-
tions of public management regulations by local government officials revealed in these reports as
irregularities in public management. The irregularities reported by auditors range from improper
financial reporting to lack of oversight in project implementation to waste and actual theft of public
resources. Because of the random sampling, the types and incidence of irregularities are represen-
tative of problems in the local public sector in Brazil. If compliance with homogeneous national
regulations is socially beneficial, deviations from the standard provide an objective measure of rent
extraction by local executive officials, either through outright corruption or low effort on the job.10
For the vast majority of the regulations considered by auditors in Brazil, compliance is likely to
be socially beneficial yet privately costly. Moreover, many of these standards reflect international
best practices in public financial management (PEFA, 2006).11
Our measure of rents is based on the same reports as the corruption and mismanagement mea-
sures in Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) and Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2013), but
with two important differences.12 The first difference is that we focus on a broader set of irreg-
ularities, rather than likely instances of corruption. After all, corruption is only one type of rent
extraction.13 Moreover, corruption represents only a small fraction of irregularities uncovered by
auditors as shown in Ferraz and Finan (2011).14 However, we do distinguish management irreg-
ularities, giving direct evidence of waste or corruption in the local provision of public services,
from what we call procedural irregularities, such as irregular or non-existent financial reports,
where the connection to inefficiency is only indirect, and for which local officials are less likely
to get punished a priori. In addition to inevitable ambiguities in the identification of corruption
10Effort can be seen as negative rents as in Barro (1973) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
11In the terminology of Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) we think of most irregularities uncovered by auditors as a
measure of active waste in government spending: compliance is socially beneficial yet privately costly. If, in contrast, public
management regulations were essentially red tape—and compliance therefore of limited or no social value—irregularities
would correspond to lower passive waste.
12Zamboni and Litschig (2018) also use the published audit reports, as well as non-public administrative data at the
procurement process level, survey data on satisfaction with health service delivery, and data on household visits that are
routinely conducted by auditors.
13See Rose-Ackermann (1999, 2004) for a review of the empirical literature on poor governance, corruption and devel-
opment. See Aidt (2003) for a review of the theoretical literature.
14This is evident from the line "Share of audited items" in Table 1 of their paper, showing that the average number of
corruption episodes per audited item, conditional on at least one irregularity in the municipality, is 0.067. In contrast, the
(conditional-on-positive) average number of mismanagement episodes per audited item in their data is about 1.647.
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episodes, our main reason for focusing on management irregularities is that the law is not limited
to penalizing corruption, which requires a relatively high standard of proof because individuals
can go to jail if convicted, but allows prosecutors to charge individuals with the lesser offense of
"acts of administrative misconduct". Since the judicial check should operate on both waste and
corruption, a more comprehensive measure of rents is better suited for our purposes. The second
difference with other codings of the Brazilian municipal audit reports is that we focus on the share
of inspections with at least one irregularity rather than the number of irregularities per inspection.
As further discussed below, the existence of irregularities is likely measured more accurately than
the number of irregularities since auditor discretion in reporting plays much less of a role. In our
data, 35 percent of all inspections come up entirely clean—without any evidence of procedural or
management irregularities—while a full 55 percent show no direct evidence that public resources
were wasted or stolen.
Our main empirical result is that local presence of state judicial institutions reduces the share of
inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent. While we show
that judicial presence reduces irregularities overall, the effect turns out to be driven exclusively by
a reduction of irregularities indicating waste or corruption. The null result for procedural irregular-
ities is consistent with the intuition that less serious infractions are less likely to be reported by the
public and prosecuted by the judiciary. Consequently, such infractions should respond less to judi-
cial presence or not at all. The result also suggests that the reduction in irregularities is unlikely to
be driven by a better understanding of public management regulations and hence better compliance
in counties with local judicial presence, rather than a deterrence effect, since better understanding
would presumably affect procedural irregularities more than those indicating waste or corruption.
A further breakdown among management irregularities shows that the effect is entirely driven by
those that are visible to the general public, such as substandard or delayed project execution, rather
than unjustified or excessive payments for goods and services for example. As further discussed
below, these results are robust to the inclusion of a long list of standard and context-specific con-
trols, such as the population size of the judiciary district. We also show that population rank per
se has no effect on any type of irregularity by comparing second- to lower-ranked municipalities,
conditional on population.
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In order to shed additional light on mechanisms, we investigate whether the impact of local
presence of the judiciary on rent extraction depends on the mayor’s re-election incentives. This is
the main focus of Ferraz and Finan (2011) who show that mayors in their first term in office are
less corrupt compared to mayors in their second term. Although these authors do not attempt to
identify the causal effect of local judiciary presence, they find that in counties with judicial pres-
ence the effect of re-election incentives on corruption is reduced. Using our broader measure of
rents, in contrast, we find just the opposite: re-election incentives increase the effect of local judi-
ciary presence.15 In fact, for mayors in their second term, local judicial presence does not seem
to matter at all. Put differently, our estimates suggest that judicial presence reduces rent extraction
only among first-term mayors. Importantly, this differential effect by mayoral term does not re-
flect differences in average income or education of the population or the presence of media across
municipalities with first- versus second-term mayors. Together with the fact that the reduction of
irregularities is concentrated among those that are visible to the general public, these results sug-
gest that judicial presence operates through an increased probability of detection and prosecution,
disciplining mayors with re-election incentives. This interpretation is consistent with evidence
for Brazil showing that the revelation of corruption does have electoral consequences (Ferraz and
Finan, 2008; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013).16 If instead judicial presence increased the prob-
ability of conviction, we should see an effect for second-term incumbents as well. The null result
for second-term mayors is in line with the fact that actual convictions of local officials were very
rare events in Brazil during our sample period (Arantes, 2004, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the audits program and give institu-
tional background on the role of the state judiciary in providing a check on local executive power
in Brazil. In Section 3 we discuss the territorial organization of the judiciary and our identification
strategy. Section 4 presents our dataset on irregularities in local public management. Section 5 dis-
cusses our estimation approach. Results are presented in Section 6. We conclude with a discussion
of limitations and extensions.
15There is no reason to expect our results to be similar to those reported in Ferraz and Finan (2011) because of our sample
restrictions (excluding single-municipality judiciary districts, as well as municipalities with population above 40,000), a
different outcome variable (broad rents vs. corruption), and our instrumentation for judicial presence.
16In general, the extent to which voters in Latin America punish corrupt politicians may depend on economic conditions
(Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013; Manzetti and Rosas, 2015).
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2 Audits program and institutional background
2.1 The random audits program
The random audits program was initiated under the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in
March 2003 with the explicit objective of fighting corruption and waste in local public spending.
Most municipalities were eligible for federal audit from the start of the program with the exception
of state capitals.17 Several rounds of sampling occur each year through a public lottery. The
machinery used for the selection of municipalities is the same as that used for a popular national
(money) lottery and results are broadcast on television and through other media. Our empirical
analysis is based on a sample of 1,064 counties (about 20 percent of all counties in 2000) that have
been audited through June 2006.18 Sampling is geographically stratified by state. Larger states
tended to have lower sampling probabilities in the beginning of the program but probabilities have
converged to around 1 percent per lottery.
The program is implemented by the general comptroller’s office (CGU), the internal audit in-
stitution of the federal government. When a county is selected, the CGU headquarters in Brasilia
determines the specific aspects of programs and projects that are audited and issues detailed inspec-
tion orders (ordens de serviço)—standardized sets of program- or project-specific inspections—to
state CGU branches. For simplicity we will usually refer to service orders as inspections, although
technically service orders are sets of inspections. Teams of auditors that are based in the state
CGU branches are then sent to the sampled county. Transfers eligible for audit include those that
are earmarked to carry out national health and education policies (legais), direct transfers to cit-
izens (diretas), as well as other negotiated transfers (voluntarias), but exclude revenue-sharing
transfers, such as those from the Fundo de Participação dos Municípios. Inspections occur for a
subset of eligible federal transfers made during the preceding two to three years.
The number of auditors dispatched depends on county size (area and population), the propor-
tion of rural and urban areas and the number of inspection orders, which in turn depends on the
number of programs and projects running in the municipality. For instance, a county with a small
17More specifically, eligibility for federal audit is based on a population threshold which was successively increased from
20’000 to 500’000.
18The number of municipal audits carried out through round 21 is 1,091. 21 municipalities were audited twice, and for 6
municipalities we lack census characteristics because they were installed after the year 2000.
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population and a low number of items to be checked, but with a large rural area may require more
auditors than another county with larger population but more people living in urban areas. In ad-
dition, municipalities for which the CGU has received a lot of complaints or where the mayor was
recently impeached, receive larger teams.
Within a week of the county sampling, auditors spend about two weeks in the county in order
to carry out their inspection orders. The quality of public services is assessed through interviews
with the local population and service staff members. Auditors then write a report which details
all the irregularities encountered during their mission. Reports include the amounts of resources
audited, and if possible, any fraction that was diverted, wasted or stolen. This fraction is just a
preliminary estimate, however. The exact amount diverted can only be assessed through a more
detailed inspection which occurs only if it is subsequently deemed appropriate by the prosecutor
in charge of the municipality. County mayors are given the possibility to comment on the draft
report within five business days. Auditors in turn explain whether or not they accept the mayor’s
justification for detected irregularities. If the auditors concede that there are valid arguments for
non-compliance, we exclude these instances from our measures.
2.2 The role of the judiciary as a check on local executive power
Final audit reports are sent to local legislatures, the federal ministries that are remitting the trans-
fers, external audit institutions at state and federal levels, as well as state and federal prosecutors.
Prosecutors then decide whether to further investigate the irregularities uncovered by auditors and
whether and what charges to press against particular individuals. Administrative misconduct is
prosecuted at the local level, while prosecution of corruption falls into the jurisdiction of the state
attorney general and judgment is passed by the state court of justice.
If convicted of corruption, defendants may be imprisoned for 1 to 8 years, in addition to losing
their mandate and incurring fines. If convicted of "acts of administrative misconduct" or "impro-
bity", punishments include the loss of mandate, the suspension of political rights for 8 to 10 years,
prohibition from entering into public contracts for 10 years as well as the obligation to reimburse
public coffers. In addition to charging individuals with corruption or administrative improbity,
prosecutors have the privilege to use civil requests, requiring the entity in question to change its
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practice or be fined and prosecuted.19 Because the courts cannot initiate proceedings on their own,
prosecutors play a key role in the criminal justice system.20
In Brazil, prosecutors and judges are not part of local governments but of the state government
and they are granted substantial de iure and de facto independence. The 1988 Constitution stipu-
lates that individual prosecutors cannot be fired and guarantees their salaries. Prosecutors are hired
through highly competitive entry examinations. At the state level, the only formal political influ-
ence occurs through the appointment of the attorney-general by the state governor from a short-list
of three candidates who are members of the state procuracy.
3 Background on judiciary districts and identification
3.1 Background on judiciary districts
We are interested in estimating the causal effect of judicial presence on rent extraction in local gov-
ernments. The main empirical challenge is that state judiciary officials might choose the location
of the local judiciary seat at least partly in response to local conditions.21 We address potential
endogeneity of local judicial presence by exploiting a common institutional feature across state ju-
diciary systems that is mandated by federal law: although state judiciary branches provide services
to all counties in a given state, only those counties that are sufficiently large in terms of observ-
able characteristics may become a judiciary district (comarca in Portuguese) by themselves and
get a physical presence of judges and prosecutors. State-level laws specify necessary—although
not sufficient—conditions for the creation of judiciary districts in terms of population size and
typically a subset of other characteristics, such as geographical area, size of the electorate, county
fiscal revenue, judicial caseload and the existence of facilities for the courthouse, prison, police
quarters and residence of the judge and prosecutor.22 Table 1 gives details for each state.
Our research design is necessarily silent on the causal effect of judicial presence for single-
19See Arantes (2004) on the organization and legal instruments at the disposal of the Brazilian Ministerio Público.
20Prosecutors do not have the monopoly to charge individuals with corruption or administrative improbity as Art. 5 of the
Brazilian constitution gives that right to ordinary citizens as well. Citizens rarely press charges, however. In addition, legis-
latures have the right to hold the executive accountable through impeachment proceedings. This channel of accountability
depends entirely on the power configuration inside the legislature.
21This is what Becker’s (1968) model of crime and punishment would suggest. In addition to reverse causality, omitted
variable bias is also likely.
22Typically, these same observables are also used to rank judiciary districts and allocate judicial presence on the intensive
margin in terms of number of courts, judges, etc.
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county districts since we lack information about the assignment rule in these cases.23 However,
roughly 75 percent of all counties do not become their own judiciary district. These counties are
grouped together with contiguous neighbors, and only one of them becomes the local judiciary seat
(sede da comarca) and gets the physical presence of prosecutors and judges. New judiciary district
formation is typically preceded by municipality splitting and tends to respect prior district bound-
aries. For example, municipalities Nova Bandeirantes and Nova Monte Verde both split away from
Alta Floresta in Mato Grosso state in 1993 and became their own judiciary district in 2004. Nova
Monte Verde became the seat with slightly larger population. Similarly, and also in Mato Grosso
state, Ilha Solteira and Suzanapolis municipalities became independent from Pereira Barreto in
1993 but stayed members of the old judiciary district. None of the spin-off municipalities be-
came the judiciary seat. This is not to say that prior district boundaries are always respected. For
example in Minas Gerais state, Curral de Dentro and Divisa Alegre both split away from Aguas
Vermelhas in 1997 and got incorporated into other existing judiciary districts. Nonetheless, our
analysis suggests that new district formation is typically done within prior district boundaries.
State laws usually do not specify which of the contiguous counties forming a multi-county
judiciary district gets the physical presence of prosecutors and judges. The two exceptions we
know of are the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, where the law explicitly prescribes
that the seat of the judiciary district must be located in the most populous county or the one which
is easiest to reach (Código de Organização e Divisão Judiciárias, Art. 8 and Art. 11, respectively).
In states where the law is silent on this issue, we have verified with judges and technical judicial
staff that the internally used assignment rule is to locate the judiciary seat in the most populous
county at the time of district creation because this minimizes transaction costs to access judicial
services for citizens.
For the purpose of our analysis, we need to know whether or not a municipality had a judi-
cial presence at the time irregularities were committed. Since the audits in our dataset happened
between April 2003 and June 2006, and since the typical audit goes back about two years, the
relevant period ranges from January 2001 to June 2006. We use the last completed year for which
23The vast majority of single-county judiciary districts meet the state-specific requirements even though exceptions—
determined at the discretion of the judiciary—are explicitly allowed by law (Lei Complementar No 35, de 14 de Março de
1979, Art. 97, 2nd paragraph).
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we have irregularities data, 2005, as our benchmark year to measure judicial presence based on
the relevant legislation from each state. Because judicial presence is highly persistent over time,
almost all counties with judicial presence in 2005 already had it in 2001. Table 1 documents that
half the states in Brazil created the last new judiciary seats in 2001 or earlier and those states that
created new seats later did so mostly until 2003.
Table 2 summarizes the territorial organization of the judiciary across Brazilian states at two
points in time, 1999 and 2005. Information on local judicial presence in 1999 is from a nation-wide
survey entitled “Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros: Gestão Pública”, conducted by the national
statistical agency, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Table 2 shows that there
were slightly more than two counties per judiciary district averaged across Brazil in 2005. Because
of a substantial number of single-county districts, the average district size for districts that grouped
more than one county together was about three. The table also shows that the number of judiciary
districts in Brazil has increased only little between 1999 and 2005. Although not shown in the
table, the vast majority (95 percent) of counties that had a local judicial presence in 1999 also had
it in 2005 (and vice versa), making judicial presence a permanent feature of the local institutional
environment.
3.2 Identification
Ideally, we would use population rank at the time of district creation as our instrument for current
judicial presence, controlling for population at the time of district creation. This strategy is not
feasible because the required information would be extremely costly to obtain. Information on the
year of district creation is at best scattered across Brazil’s 26 judiciary systems, at worst across the
2,607 districts existing in 2005 (Table 2). Moreover, although districts were created at different
points in time, we would probably end up controlling for municipality population at a common
point in time in any case, even if we knew their population at the time of district creation.
Instead, we use the fact that population rank within districts is very stable over time. For
example, over the period from 1997 (the most recent year of municipality creation in our estimation
sample) to 2005, only two percent of municipalities changed population rank within their district.
As a result, population rank in 2005 likely provides a good approximation for rank at the time
12
of district creation. The same is not true for population levels, however, and contemporaneous
population levels might be themselves influenced by judicial presence. To address this issue, we
control for population levels in 2000, which could not have been affected by the irregularities in
our sample since these start in 2001. We use an indicator for judiciary-district-specific maximum
population in 2005—the year for which we know the district composition based on the relevant
legislation from each state—as our instrument for contemporaneous local judicial presence. In the
online appendix we show that results are robust to alternative choices of population rank in prior
years.
Essentially, our reduced form compares counties that are largest in their district to counties
with identical population size from other districts in the same state where they are not the most
populous. More formally, let Y denote the outcome variable (share of inspections with at least one
irregularity), D treatment status (one for judicial presence, 0 otherwise), Z the instrument (one for
judiciary-district-specific maximum population, zero otherwise), X municipality population, and
U and V the influence of unobservables that affect Y and D, respectively. Assuming that the effect
of judicial presence is constant, we can write the outcome and first stage equations as follows:
Y D D D C X X C Z Z CU
D D  Z Z C  X X C V
We write a linear specifications for X in the outcome and first stage equations only for simplicity.
In practice we include polynomial terms in X or a set of dummy variables for counties with similar
values of X to flexibly control for population. Correlation between U and V (common factors
determining both judicial presence and outcomes) leads to a correlation between D and U and
hence endogeneity of D, even conditional on X . As a result, multiple regression and matching
estimators will lead to inconsistent estimates under this data generating process.
Instead, our instrumental variable approach explicitly allows for a correlation between U and
V since it only uses variation in D induced by Z to estimate D. Under the conditional indepen-
dence assumption, district maximum population is mean independent of U and V , conditional on
population: E.U jZ ; X/ D E.U jX/ and E.V jZ ; X/ D E.V jX/. And under the exclusion restric-
tion Z D 0: We include Z in the data generating process (but not in the estimation equation) to
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emphasize that the exclusion restriction is a separate assumption from conditional mean indepen-
dence (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Instrument exogeneity amounts to both of these assumptions
together. Without the exclusion restriction, the reduced form identifies D Z C Z , which in our
context is arguably not a parameter combination that is of interest. With the first stage assumption,
 Z > 0, it can easily be shown that the ratio of reduced form coefficients on Z identifies D:
E.Y jZ D 1; X/  E.Y jZ D 0; X/
E.DjZ D 1; X/  E.DjZ D 0; X/ D
D Z
 Z
D D: (1)
In what follows, we assess the plausibility of the three main identifying assumptions that lead to
this result and discuss how we test them empirically with the data at hand.
3.3 Assessing conditional mean independence
The key threat to the conditional independence assumption is that unobserved factors that are cor-
related with population rank also have an effect on outcomes, even conditional on population. Both
of these conditions must hold for conditional mean independence to fail, that is, the omitted factor
must be both relevant and correlated with the instrument, conditional on population. For example,
a second-ranked municipality is by construction part of a larger district than a top-ranked munic-
ipality, once we compare municipalities of the same population size, and so population rank is
mechanically correlated with district population size. Similarly, the second-ranked municipality
might be closer to large population centers and therefore more urban than the top-ranked munici-
pality. Proximity to state capitals might also be related to outcomes through agglomeration effects
for example. But conditional mean independence only fails if district population size, urbanization
or proximity to state capitals also have direct effects on outcomes, conditional on municipality
population.
More formally, let W denote a potential confounder, e.g. district size, W the effect of W
on Y , and U 0 the influence of remaining unobserved factors that affect outcomes, so that we
can write E.U jZ ; X/ D E.W W C U 0jZ ; X/ D W E.W jZ ; X/ C E.U 0jZ ; X/. As long as
E.U 0jZ ; X/ D E.U 0jX/ and E.W jZ ; X/ t E.W jX/ or W t 0; conditional mean indepen-
dence will hold. We show below that although district size, urbanization and distance to the state
capital are indeed correlated with being the top-ranked municipality in the district, the correlations
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are either small in magnitude or the effects of these confounders on outcomes are close to zero,
once we control for municipality population. We also show that estimates of the effect of judicial
presence are robust to including more standard controls such as income per capita and average ed-
ucation of the local population (Glaeser and Saks, 2006), ease of access to information (Reinikka
and Svensson, 2005), proxied by the presence of a local radio station and internet access, voter
turnout (Zingales, 2004), and measures of local government capacity, such as whether there are
digitized records of assets and whether accounting and budget control are computerized. Results
are also robust to the inclusion of mayor party affiliation indicators and other mayor characteristics,
such as age and whether the mayor has been re-elected as in Ferraz and Finan (2011). In addition,
our controls include the number of civil servants as well as own revenue, federal and state transfers
and total municipal spending, all in per capita terms, in order to account for the size of the local
administration.
Of course there might be remaining unobserved factors that are correlated with population rank
and that also have an effect on outcomes, even conditional on population. For example, judiciary
district formation could be endogenous in the sense that better managed counties might success-
fully pressure state officials to be grouped into judiciary districts with smaller neighbors, making
the top-ranked counties systematically better managed than lower-ranked counties in other dis-
tricts, even conditional on population. While we cannot rule out this possibility, we consider it
unlikely for several reasons. First, since new district formation is constrained by contiguity re-
quirements typically within prior district boundaries, the potential for selective groupings of mu-
nicipalities is limited in practice. Second, top population rank within a district does not guarantee
judicial presence, it only makes it more likely, as further discussed below. It is therefore more plau-
sible that certain counties would lobby directly for judicial presence, rather than for rank within
their district. Our IV approach allows for such behavior since it only uses variation in judicial
presence for municipalities that comply with their assignment based on population rank. Third, if
district formation were indeed endogenous, this would likely show up in sizeable observable dif-
ferences between top- and lower-ranked municipalities that matter for outcomes. It is reassuring
in this respect that our estimate of interest is essentially unchanged when we include the long list
of observables discussed above, once we condition on population.
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3.4 Assessing the exclusion restriction
In addition to being independent of unobservables, conditional on population, being the largest
county in the district should affect rent extraction only through local judicial presence, not by
itself. It is worth emphasizing that other public or private institutions, such as local newspapers or
TV stations, might of course use the same travel cost minimization logic as the judiciary to locate
their headquarters in the most populous among a set of contiguous counties. But local newspapers
or TV stations would presumably rank municipalities in terms of population within their respective
media markets, not necessarily within judiciary districts. A violation of the exclusion restriction
would only arise if local media markets were for some reason congruent with judiciary districts and
media headquarters would locate in the largest municipality of the district, irrespective of whether
the court is actually present. In that case there might be a direct effect of top population-rank on
outcomes because of local media presence, even conditional on population.
A more likely scenario is that public or private institutions are choosing to locate in the munic-
ipality where the local court is based because of complementarities with activities of the judiciary.
For example, many states explicitly require the existence of facilities for the prison and police
quarters in the municipality in order to create a judiciary seat as shown in Table 1. Increased
state police presence is therefore a direct consequence of judicial presence, not a violation of the
exclusion restriction. Put differently, state police would not be more present in the top-ranked
municipality within the district in terms of population if it were not for complementarities with
judicial investigations. This implies that one of the channels through which judicial presence op-
erates might be through a higher presence of state police, which might reduce the cost of reporting
malfeasance in the local administration.24 Similarly, local media presence would be a channel of
influence of judicial presence rather than a violation of the exclusion restriction.
A key advantage of our research design is that we can partially assess the validity of the ex-
clusion restriction empirically, using a falsification test. If top population rank within the district
had no direct effect on outcomes per se, conditional on population, it seems natural to expect no
difference between second-ranked and lower-ranked municipalities either. The falsification test
24Judicial presence in general and state police presence in particular may also deter crime in the private sector. We have
not explored this possibility due to space constraints.
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we perform therefore compares our measures of rent extraction between municipalities that are
second-ranked in their district and those that are lower-ranked, conditional on population. As
shown in Section 6 below, we find no effect of this “false” treatment, suggesting that population
rank per se does not matter for rent extraction. As a result, it seems likely that the exclusion
restriction holds, once we control for population.
3.5 Assessing the first stage
Finally, the first stage assumption requires that the probability of having a judiciary presence in the
municipality is higher when the municipality is largest within its district, conditional on population.
We show below that, controlling for population and other covariates, the first stage estimate is about
74 percentage points and highly significant.
If the effect of local judicial presence on rent extraction is heterogeneous, we estimate a local
average treatment effect for small- to medium-sized municipalities in multi-county districts.25 This
average effect excludes those municipalities which—perhaps for political reasons—get a judicial
presence irrespective of population rank, as well as those which do not get a judicial presence,
irrespective of population rank. This result requires the monotonicity assumption, which in our
case says that municipalities that got a judicial presence when they were not largest in their district,
would have also gotten judicial presence had they been the most populous.26
Because the subpopulation of complier municipalities (for which district-specific population
rank determines judicial presence) represents a sizeable share of all municipalities in Brazil—as
indicated by the first stage of 74 percentage points—the estimated local effect might be fairly
representative of the average effect among small- to medium-sized municipalities.
4 Data
The first subsection presents our measures of rent extraction in more detail. The second subsection
discusses potential systematic measurement error. The last subsection summarizes the data on
other municipality characteristics.
25Abadie (2003) shows that if P.Z D 1jX/ is linear in X (and if appropriate regularity conditions hold), then the IV
estimand with covariates provides a MMSE approximation to the average causal response for compliers.
26See Angrist and Imbens (1994) or Angrist and Pischke (2009) for background on local average treatment effects.
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4.1 Data on irregularities in local public management
Audit report findings were compiled into a database by a team of researchers directed by Francisco
Ramos at the federal university of Pernambuco. Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of
1,064 counties (about 20 percent of all counties in 2000) that have been audited through June
2006.27 Our dataset is at the level of the inspection order and contains the year when the audited
transaction was made, the amount involved in the audited program or project, as well as detailed
audit findings. Following the practice of the comptroller general’s office, we refer to the reported
infractions of public sector management regulations as irregularities. It is worth emphasizing that
each reported irregularity constitutes a breach of a specific legal norm by a local official and is
potentially subject to prosecution.28
The violations reported by auditors range from improper financial reporting to lack of oversight
in project implementation to waste and actual theft of public resources. The following quotes,
translated from actual audit reports, illustrate the types of irregularities encountered by auditors.
1) We verify the existence of improper payments to administrative staff at the expense of
service personnel in the health care center. This situation is contrary to health ministry
regulation which explicitly prohibits the use of federal transfers to this end.29
2) Our inspection of the project execution for two sanitary units reveals that they were
constructed in smaller dimensions than projected. We also found that the height of the
ceramic masonry in the bathroom was constructed below project specifications.30
3) The mayor’s office failed to organize a competitive tender for the procurement of
school textbooks under the pretext that these books were unique although equivalent
alternative textbooks were in fact available. The same administration had purchased
different textbooks in the past.31
Most of the irregularities uncovered by auditors are not easily classified as corrupt practices,
in the sense of indicating abuse of public office for private (material) gain, although they very
27The number of municipal audits carried out through round 21 is 1,091. 21 municipalities were audited twice, and for 6
municipalities we lack census characteristics because they were installed after the year 2000.
28Not all irregularities reported by auditors are under the control of local officials. We exclude those (few) instances from
our measures where auditors report on state or federal government failures or where reported irregularities are otherwise
beyond local government control.
299th lottery, Salgado de São Félix municipality, Paraíba state, Primary and Preventive Health Care Program.
3010th lottery, Farias Brito municipality, Ceará state, Programa Esporte Solidário.
3111th lottery, Abaetetuba municipality, Pará state, Programa Brasil Alfabetizado.
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often do reflect bad public management.32 Indeed, none of the examples above appear to unam-
biguously involve corruption. In all examples however, managers were circumventing regulations
that are intended to benefit end-users of public services or they were not exerting enough effort
on their job. They diverted public funds intended for health service providers, failed to oversee
project implementation by contractors, which led to sub-standard project execution, and circum-
vented procurement procedures that are privately costly to carry out. As these examples illustrate,
distinguishing corruption from bad management is very difficult in practice. In fact, even with
the support from prosecutors who—contrary to auditors—can request authorization from a judge
to use wiretaps and to obtain suspect bank account records, identifying corrupt schemes is very
costly and time-consuming.33 As a result, auditors themselves deliberately abstain from labeling
particular irregularities as corruption episodes and our paper follows their example. Fortunately
for our purposes it is not necessary to distinguish between corruption and bad management, since
the law is not limited to penalizing corruption, allowing prosecutors to charge individuals with the
lesser offense of administrative misconduct as discussed in Section 2.2.
However, it is also clearly the case that not all irregularities are equally serious. In line with
CGU headquarter guidelines, we distinguish practices that indicate waste or corruption in the local
provision of public services, which we label management irregularities, from practices where the
connection to inefficiency is only indirect, such as irregular or non-existent financial reports, which
we refer to as procedural irregularities. The distinction between management and procedural ir-
regularities is also important as a robustness check on our results because local officials are a priori
less likely to get punished for procedural irregularities and hence judicial presence should matter
less for the incidence of these practices, if at all. We also subdivide management irregularities into
those that are likely visible to the general public, such as substandard or delayed project execu-
32Other existing objective measures typically capture corruption together with more general forms of government inef-
ficiency. This issue is most pronounced with unit cost measures (Golden and Picci 2005) and input prices for hospital
supplies (Di Tella and Schargrodski 2003). It also seems likely that at least part of the difference between funds disbursed
by the central government and funds reported by recipients (schools) reflects management quality, i.e. adequate book-
keeping, rather than corruption (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Similarly, at least part of the difference between reported
expenditure on road construction and estimated actual expenditure may be due to project management, i.e. attention to
materials lost in the construction process, rather than corruption (Olken 2007).
33A good example of this is given by the "Sanguessuga" scandal. The first hints about the scheme came from inspections in
several municipalities, spread across 10 Brazilian states, where auditors identified apparently small problems in a number
of procurement processes that were won by the same ambulance seller. Once this pattern was identified, CGU auditors
decided to dig deeper, and more irregularities were found, but still there was no clear evidence of corruption. Eventually,
federal police and prosecutors joined the investigation and after many hours of recorded phone calls and bank account
searches, the whole scheme was uncovered and hundreds of individuals, including mayors and deputies, were charged with
corruption or administrative misconduct. Since 2003, over 30 operations of similarly large scale have been conducted.
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tion, and those irregularities that are likely only revealed by a formal audit, such as unjustified or
excessive payments for goods and services or favouritism in contract awarding. 1) and 2) above
are examples of diversion of program resources and substandard project execution, respectively,
which we classify as visible management irregularities. 3) is an unjustified direct purchase, which
we code as a nonvisible management irregularity. In appendix I below we enumerate all types of
irregularities as they are reported by auditors, as well as our own classification into procedural,
visible and nonvisible management varieties. In the online appendix we discuss how our measure
of rents relates to existing corruption and mismanagement codings by Ferraz and Finan (2011) and
Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti and Tabellini (2013).
An important challenge for any measure of rents is how to deal with issues of scale. The raw
reported number of irregularities or corruption episodes is a problematic measure of rents because
it mechanically increases with local government size (more locally administered programs, more
scope for irregularities) and with the number of inspections that are carried out (more inspections,
more reported irregularities). In order to address this issue, we construct a unique dataset at the
level of the service order by obtaining those inspections from the audit reports which turned up no
irregularities at all, and by relating each irregularity to its corresponding service order.
Since judicial presence varies at the level of the municipality, we construct our main outcome
as the share of inspections with at least one irregularity of a given type. We discard information
on the number of irregularities per inspection because of likely measurement error in the number
of irregularities as a result of non-standardized reporting and the interaction between the discovery
of irregularities and further inspections. In fact, some of the reported irregularities may simply
describe various aspects of the same underlying problem that different auditors report in different
ways. Random measurement error in the number of irregularities would lead to noisier estimates
and we find indeed that standard errors are an order of magnitude larger when the count of ir-
regularities is used in the numerator. Results are available on request. In contrast, the share of
inspections with at least one irregularity should be measured more accurately since auditor discre-
tion in reporting the extent of the underlying issue plays no role.
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4.2 Systematic measurement error
A first caveat related to systematic measurement is that we need to assume that auditors themselves
were not bribed into manipulating audit findings. If this manipulation were for some reason more
likely in municipalities with judicial presence, it would bias our estimates. However, we believe
that the institutional setup makes it very unlikely that auditors are corrupt. First, auditors are paid
by the federal government, not by local governments, which makes it less likely that they are
captured by local special interests. Second, auditors are relatively well paid, and therefore have
a lot to lose in case collusion gets detected. Third, auditors work in teams of about 10 people on
average. This makes it hard to sustain collusion on any significant scale because the whole team
has to be bribed in order to conceal irregularities. Fourth, the interaction between auditors and
local officials is at a single point in time (unknown ex ante), which again makes it harder to sustain
collusion. Finally, CGU auditors’ work is itself subject to periodic inspection from the external
audit agency of the central government, the Tribunal de Contas da União and we are not aware of
any reported cases of collusion between CGU auditors and local administrations.
The second caveat is that even if auditors were incorruptible, the local elite might somehow
manage to manipulate what gets uncovered and what remains unnoticed. While this scenario is
plausible in general, it is unlikely in our case because local elites play no direct role in carrying
out the audit. Auditors go into a county with specific orders to investigate particular programs
and projects and the items on their list are not subject to local review. Neither is it likely that
local managers succeed in systematically concealing more irregular transactions in counties with
judicial presence because the audit is very thorough, involving both financial auditing and detailed
inspection of public works and services in the field. Since hiding malfeasance is costly, there will
necessarily be instances where the extra cost induced by judicial presence exceeds the expected
benefits of committing the offense, thus leading to less offenses (Becker 1968). It is also impor-
tant to keep in mind that not all irregularities are easy to conceal. While nonvisible irregularities,
such as favouritism in contract awarding, may potentially go unnoticed even by auditors, visible
irregularities, such as substandard project execution or insufficient front-line staff at the health post
are much harder to hide from the public. Last but not least, Olken (2007) finds that administrative
irregularities in road construction detected by central government auditors are positively correlated
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with missing expenditures as determined by independent engineers. It seems likely that there is
less underdetection of corruption based on an unexpected type of audit as conducted by engineers,
compared to irregularities reported in routine audits. If missing expenditures and administrative
irregularities are positively correlated not only in the Indonesian but also in the Brazilian setting,
then at least part of the impact of judicial presence we find reflects a real reduction in rent extrac-
tion.
4.3 Data on county characteristics
Data on county characteristics come from several sources. We obtained the composition of judi-
ciary districts and the indicator for local judicial presence from each state’s law on the organization
and territorial division of the judiciary branch (Código da Organização e Divisão Judiciárias). For
most states, the data on judiciary districts and local judicial presence is from the year 2005. To
construct our instrument, we therefore rank municipalities within each judiciary district in terms of
year 2005 population. Information on local judicial presence in 1999 is from a nation-wide survey
entitled “Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros: Gestão Pública”, conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). The same source also has information on the number of mu-
nicipal civil servants, presence of a radio station, internet access, the extent of digitized records of
municipal assets and computerized accounting and budget control. Official local population data
for the years 2000 and 2005 are also from IBGE.34 Data on local income distribution, schooling,
and distance to state capitals are from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) based
on the 2000 census. Mayor characteristics and political participation data are from the Tribunal
Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Finally, we extract total municipal spending, own revenue and state and
federal transfers received by the municipality from the Finanças do Brasil compiled by the Brazil-
ian national treasury. Especially in the data on local government budgets there are some missing
values. In each of these cases we impute the corresponding sample average in order not to lose
the entire observation. There are 42 observations with at least one imputed covariate value in the
estimation sample. Our regressions always include a dummy for whether an imputation took place.
34For intercensal years, such as 2005, official population estimates are produced using a forecasting procedure that ensures
consistency of estimates for lower level units (municipalities) with the higher levels (states and the country as a whole)
(IBGE, 2002).
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5 Estimation approach
We use an indicator for district-specific top population rank as an instrument for judicial presence.
Since population size of the municipality is a key confounder, it is crucial for our approach to
adequately control for population. Figure 1 shows that for small- to medium-sized municipalities
up to about 40,000 inhabitants, there is a common support of population among those ranked
second or lower in terms of population in their district (Z=0) and those that are top-ranked (Z=1).
In order to ensure a common support, we therefore drop top-ranked municipalities with population
above 40,000 from the sample. We only trim from the top because the two supports overlap much
better at the bottom, as is evident from Figure 1. We also drop single-county judiciary districts,
which satisfy all requirements by themselves and are therefore intrinsically different from those
that do not. These two sample restrictions are dictated by our knowledge of the assignment rule
for multi-county judiciary districts and the fact that we lack such institutional information about
single-county judiciary districts.
We control for the direct effect of population on outcomes using polynomial terms in year 2000
census population, determined prior to the audit results used in this study. We also control for pop-
ulation nonparametrically with a set of indicators for population within bins of width 2,500. All
estimations include state fixed effects because the probability of having a local judicial presence
varies systematically across states (as evident from Table 2), as does our measure of rent extrac-
tion. We cannot include judiciary district fixed effects for two reasons: first, with population held
constant we necessarily compare counties from different districts, and second, we would lose dis-
tricts without variation in the instrument (recall that we have outcome measures only for audited
municipalities, not for all municipalities within a given district).
We also investigate whether the impact of judicial presence depends on the mayor’s re-election
incentives. In order to account for differences in average income or education of the population
or the presence of media across municipalities with first- versus second-term mayors, we run in-
strumental variable regressions with covariate interactions. We demean the covariates so that the
coefficient on judiciary presence retains its interpretation as an average effect. Demeaned covari-
ates are interacted with the instrument in the first stage and with judiciary seat in the second stage.
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6 Results
6.1 Covariate balance conditional on population
Table 3 shows the correlation between judicial presence, top population rank within the district
and 20 covariates, both unconditionally and conditional on population. The sample consists of
721 municipalities that were audited through round 21, excluding single-county judiciary districts,
as well as municipalities with population above 40,000. Column (1) gives the mean and standard
deviation of each covariate among municipalities without judicial presence. Column (2) shows
the difference in means compared to municipalities with judicial presence and in parentheses the
corresponding standard error. Columns (3) and (4) show a similar comparison but by population
rank within the judiciary district, that is, top-ranked versus not-top-ranked. There are sizeable
differences in the raw sample means in both columns (2) and (4), making it clear that controlling
for population is crucial for our approach.
Column (5) shows the adjusted difference estimate, including dummies for population within
bins of width 2,500 as well as state fixed effects. The estimate for municipality population in the
first row is 120, suggesting that the nonparametric approach successfully eliminates the difference
in average population of almost 11,000 inhabitants between top- and not-top-ranked municipalities
shown in column (4). Other covariates still exhibit sizeable differences by population rank how-
ever, even controlling for population. For example, top-ranked municipalities are part of judiciary
districts with 77,000 fewer inhabitants on average, compared to not-top-ranked municipalities.
While this difference seems large, it is a bit difficult to interpret because it does not account for the
fact that larger districts tend to have more courts and prosecutors. Similarly, top-ranked municipal-
ities are about 44 kilometers further away from their respective state capital on average, compared
to an average distance of 266 kilometers among not-top-ranked municipalities. Whether condi-
tional on municipality population, the size of the judiciary district or distance to the state capital
matter for rent-taking are empirical questions which we investigate below.
The remaining adjusted difference estimates are rather small in magnitude, even though some
are statistically clearly different from zero. For instance, income per capita, average years of
schooling, the proportion living in urban areas, the size of the electorate and the number of mu-
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nicipal civil servants are only about 9 percent higher in top-ranked municipalities, conditional on
population. Similarly, potentially important determinants of rent-taking, such as federal and state
transfers and total municipal spending per capita are only about 9 percent lower in top-ranked
municipalities, conditional on population. Overall, there are thus few sizeable observable differ-
ences between top- and lower-ranked municipalities, once we condition on population. Moreover,
as shown below, these differences do not seem to matter much for outcomes, conditional on pop-
ulation, as the estimate of interest is essentially unchanged when we include the entire list of
observables from Table 3 plus a set of dummies for the mayor’s party affiliation.
6.2 First stage
Table 4 presents linear probability model (OLS) estimates of the first stage relationship between
local judicial presence (judiciary seat) and the indicator for judiciary-district-specific maximum
population (maximum population), conditional on population. All regressions include state fixed
effects. Estimates with linear, quadratic, cubic and nonparametric population controls are shown
in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) respectively. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) show the corresponding
estimates when all the controls from Table 3 plus a set of dummies for mayoral party affiliations
are also included. The first stage estimates for the full sample in Panel A suggest that without
additional controls, the probability of having a local presence of the judicial apparatus increases
by about 80 percentage points if the county is largest in its district, for counties with the same
population size. Some of the additional controls are slightly correlated with the instrument since
the point estimates with controls decrease to about 74 percentage points. The implied first stage
F-statistic is t2 D .0:74=0:04/2 D 342, well beyond conventional critical values for the weak
instrument test based on TSLS size (Stock and Yogo 2005). Panels B and C of Table 4 show
that the first stage is similar in magnitude and statistical significance, irrespective of whether the
municipality is run by a first- or second-term mayor.
Figure 2 presents graphical evidence of the first stage. Each dot in Figure 2 corresponds to
the sample proportion of municipalities that are judicial seats for a given judiciary-district-specific
population rank (top or not-top) and in a given population bin. Consistent with Figure 1 above,
there is a lot of overlap in the two distributions of population in top- and lower-ranked municipal-
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ities except at the boundaries of the support. In fact, there are no top-ranked municipalities in the
population range 0 to 2,500 and no lower-ranked municipalities in the range 37,500 to 40,000. Per-
haps the most striking feature of Figure 2 is that the first-stage relationship of about 80 percentage
points is approximately constant irrespective of the level of population, again with the exception
of the bins that are closest to the boundaries of the support.
6.3 Impact on the share of irregular inspections
Table 5 shows instrumental variable estimates of the effect of judicial presence using the share of
inspections that turn up at least one irregularity as the dependent variable. Panel A shows results
for any irregularity, while Panels B and C show estimates for management and procedural irregu-
larities, respectively. Point estimates for the share of inspections with at least one irregularity are
about 4 percentage points in the linear and nonparametric specifications and about 5 percentage
points in the quadratic and cubic specifications. Six out of eight estimates are statistically different
from zero at the 5 or 10 percent level. Turning to management irregularities in Panel B, the results
suggest that the overall reduction in the share of inspections with irregularities is driven entirely
by management irregularities. Point estimates are only slightly smaller than in Panel A and four
out of eight estimates are significant at 5 or 10 percent. Compared to the mean share of inspections
with management irregularities of 0.45, the effect of judicial presence on rent extraction amounts
to about  10 percent.
Panel C shows that for procedural irregularities, effect estimates are essentially zero. This re-
sult is consistent with the intuition that less serious infractions are less likely to be reported by the
public and prosecuted by the judiciary. The null result for procedural irregularities also suggests
that the reduction in management irregularities is unlikely to be driven by a better understand-
ing of public management regulations and hence better compliance in counties with local judicial
presence, since this would presumably affect procedural irregularities more than irregularities in-
dicating waste or corruption.
Another important feature of the results in Table 5 is that the effect size is remarkably robust
to the inclusion of all the municipality and mayor characteristics from Table 3 as well as mayor
party affiliation dummies. At the same time, the R-squared increases by about 5 percentage points,
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going from 19 percent to 24 percent in most cases.35 Together, the unchanged estimates and
increased fit with covariates beyond population imply both that the covariates that are correlated
with the instrument (such as judiciary district size or distance to the state capital) are not relevant
predictors of the outcome at the margin and that those that are relevant (such as mayor party
affiliation dummies) are not correlated with the instrument, conditional on population. Overall,
these results thus provide supporting evidence for the conditional mean independence assumption.
Figure 3 presents graphical evidence of the reduced form relationship between population rank
and the share of inspections that turn up at least one irregularity, conditional on population. Each
dot corresponds to the sample average of the share of inspections with at least one irregularity in
deviation from the state average for a given judiciary-district-specific population rank (top or not
top) and in a given population bin. The two solid lines in Figure 3 show that the share of irregular
inspections is about 3 to 4 percentage points lower in top-ranked municipalities compared to those
that are lower-ranked on average, conditional on population. Figure 3 also shows that the share of
irregular inspections is reduced in top-ranked municipalities in 10 out of 14 bins where both top-
and not-top-ranked municipalities are observed. Figure 1 in the online appendix presents a similar
picture of the reduced form relationship between population rank and the share of inspections with
irregularities related to waste or corruption, conditional on population.
6.4 Visible versus nonvisible irregularities
Panel A of Table 6 shows impact estimates for the share of inspections with visible management ir-
regularities, such as diversion of project resources or substandard project execution. The quadratic,
cubic, and nonparametric specifications for population suggest that judicial presence reduces the
share of inspections with visible management irregularities by about 4 to 5 percentage points. The
estimates are statistically different form zero at 5 or 10 percent in 5 out of 8 specifications. In con-
trast, the estimates in Panel B show that judicial presence has no effect on the share of inspections
with nonvisible irregularities, such as unjustified or excessive payments for goods and services or
favouritism in contract awarding. Point estimates are all negative but close to zero and none are
35While the R-squared can be negative in an IV regression, it cannot be above one because the sum of squared residuals
cannot be negative. It therefore makes sense to interpret the R-squared even in an IV regression. In particular, R-squared
increases if and only if the estimated coefficients on additional covariates are non-zero.
27
statistically significant. These results are consistent with the view that judicial presence deters
rent-taking through reduced transaction costs for the general public to report irregularities in local
public service delivery to prosecutors.
6.5 Falsification test of the exclusion restriction
Table 7 reports estimates of a falsification test that compares our measures of rent extraction be-
tween municipalities that are second-ranked in their district and those that are lower-ranked, condi-
tional on population. If top population rank within the district had no direct effect on outcomes per
se, conditional on population, it seems natural to expect no difference between second-ranked and
lower-ranked municipalities either. Results in Panel A show that the share of inspections with ir-
regularities is no different between municipalities that are second-ranked in their district and those
that are lower-ranked, conditional on population. Most of the estimates are an order of magnitude
smaller than the effect estimates of judicial presence discussed above and they are nowhere near
statistical significance. The same is true for management and procedural irregularities, shown in
Panels B and C, respectively. These result increase our confidence in the exclusion restriction, that
is, other than through judicial presence, top population rank within the district has no effect on rent
extraction.
6.6 Impacts by mayoral term
In Table 8 we test whether the effect of local presence of the judiciary on rent extraction depends
on the mayor’s term in office. In order to account for differences in average income or education
of the population or the presence of media across municipalities with first- versus second-term
mayors, we run instrumental variable regressions with covariate interactions. Since we are inter-
ested in the differential effect of judicial presence by mayoral term, we only report estimates of the
average effect and the relevant interaction term. The average effect of judicial presence is slightly
larger than in Table 5 but because standard errors increase substantially, none of the estimates are
significant. More importantly however, the estimates on the interaction term with a dummy for
first-term mayors range between  5 to  6 percentage points and are significant at 10 percent in 4
out of 8 specifications. Since judicial presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularities
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more strongly for first-term mayors compared to second-term mayors, these results suggest that
judicial and political accountability complement each other. In fact, if we focus on the nonpara-
metric estimates with controls in column (8), the estimated effect of judicial presence on the share
of irregular inspections is about  :038  0:064 0:4 D  6:4 percentage points among first-time
mayors. In contrast, for mayors in their second term, local judicial presence does not seem to mat-
ter at all . :038C 0:064 0:6 D 0/. Overall, these results indicate that judicial presence operates
through an increased probability of detection and prosecution of irregularities, which disciplines
incumbents with re-election incentives, rather than an increased probability of conviction, which
should also discipline incumbents without re-election incentives.
6.7 Additional robustness checks
Table 1 in the online appendix presents results for the share of irregular inspections based on cor-
ruption and mismanagement codings by Ferraz and Finan (2011) and Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti
and Tabellini (2013). Effect estimates of judicial presence are negative but attenuated compared
to our coding and not statistically different from zero. As discussed in more detail in the online
appendix, the effect attenuation comes from the fact that these other codings exclude certain man-
agement irregularities, such as project delays or partial and delayed remittance of cash transfers
to eligible individuals, which in fact do respond to judicial presence. Moreover, these codings in-
clude irregularities in procurement, which we argue are not easily observed by voters and thus are
not expected to respond to the presence of the judiciary apparatus. Table 2 in the online appendix
shows that judicial presence also reduces the share of audited funds with at least one irregularity
although impact estimates are again not statistically different from zero. Table 3 in the online
appendix confirms that the irregularity reduction is robust to using population rank in different
years—rather than rank in 2005—as the instrument for judicial presence in 2005. Finally, online
appendix Table 4 shows that when we replace judicial presence with travel distance to the judiciary
seat, the results are qualitatively unchanged. Specifically, we estimate that a travel reduction of 50
kilometers reduces the share of inspections with irregularities by about 5 percentage points and that
this reduction is again driven exclusively by management, rather than procedural irregularities.
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7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the role of the territorial organization of the judiciary in con-
straining rent extraction by the local executive power in Brazil. We show that local presence of
state judicial institutions reduces the share of inspections with irregularities related to waste or
corruption by about 10 percent. A further breakdown among management irregularities shows that
the effect is entirely driven by those that are visible to the general public, such as substandard or
delayed project execution, rather than unjustified or excessive payments for goods and services
for example. In addition, our results suggest that judicial presence operates through an increased
probability of detection and prosecution, which disciplines incumbents with re-election incentives,
rather than an increased probability of conviction, which should also discipline incumbents without
re-election incentives.
Given that about 75 percent of all municipalities belong to multi-county districts and that the
vast majority of them is of small to medium size, and given the high proportion of municipalities
that followed the assignment rule, the (local average) effect we identify in this study is in fact fairly
general. From a policy perspective, our results therefore suggest that scaling up judicial presence
at the local level in Brazil would likely reduce irregularities related to waste or corruption in the
local public sector. Judicial presence should be scaled up if and only if the net benefits of such
a policy are positive. While the costs of an expansion of judicial presence are relatively easy to
quantify, assessing the benefits in monetary terms is difficult as we would need to know the value
of a marginal increase in compliance with existing public sector rules and regulations (and other
benefits of local judicial presence).
Whether judicial presence reduces rent extraction in other countries and institutional contexts
as well is an open and important question. We speculate that our results help explain the fact that
state district attorneys, the U.S. institutional equivalent of Brazilian state prosecutors, today are
present in most counties in the U.S., although historically this was not the case. Since budget
constraints often require that a choice has to be made where to place the judicial apparatus, similar
research designs to the one introduced in this paper might be applicable to historical U.S. data or
to contemporary data from developing countries other than Brazil.
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Table 1: Judiciary district requirements and judiciary seat creations prior to 2005
State Judiciary district
minimal
requirements
Source Last creation of
judiciary seat
prior to 2005
Source
Acre P, C, E CODJ Art. 24 unknown CODJ 2005, 2010
Amapá P, C, B, Q CODJ Art. 4 1999 CODJ 2005
Amazonas B CODJ Art. 10 1997 CODJ 2004
Pará P, E, R, C, A, B, Q CJ Art. 10 2002 CJ 2003, 2006
Rondônia P, E, R, C, B, Q CODJ Art. 83 2003 CODJ 2003, 2006
Roraima P, E, C, B COJ Art. 28 2001 COJ 2001
Tocantins P, E, C, B, Q LOPJ Art. 6 2002 LOPJ 2002
Alagoas P, E, R, C, A, B, Q COJ Art. 125-6 1998 COJ 2005
Bahia P, E, R, C, A, B, Q LOJ Art. 7-8 unknown LOJ 2005
Ceará P, E, R, C, A, B, Q COJ Art. 57 1997 COJ 2005
Maranhão P, E CDOJ Art. 6 2004 CDOJ 2008
Paraíba P, E, R, C, A, B, Q LOJ Art. 7 2002 LOJ 2005
Pernambuco P, E, R, C COJ Art. 5 2004 COJ 2006
Piauí P, E, R, C, A, B, Q LOJ Art. 6 unknown LOJ 2008
Rio Grande do Norte P, E, C, B LDOJ Art. 7 1999 LDOJ 2005
Sergipe P, E, R, C, A COJ Art. 3 prior to 1999 COJ 2003, 2008
Goiás P, E, R, C, B COJ Art. 6 1999 COJ 2005
Mato Grosso P, E, R, C, A, B, Q CODJ Art. 11 2001 CODJ 2003
Mato Grosso do Sul P, E, R, C, A, B, Q CODJ Art. 14 2001 CODJ 2001, 2006
Espírito Santo P, E, R, C CODJ Art. 5 2002 CODJ 2002, 2008
Minas Gerais P, E, C, B, Q CODJ Art. 5 2001 CODJ 2001, 2009
Rio de Janeiro P, E, R, C CODJ Art. 11 2000 CODJ 2000, 2005
São Paulo E, C, R CODJ Art. 12 2003 CODJ 2003
Paraná P, E, R, C, B, Q CODJ Art. 216 2003 CODJ 2003
Rio Grande do Sul P, E, R, C COJ Art. 3 2000 COJ 2003
Santa Catarina P, E, R, C, A, B, Q CDOJ Art. 8-10 2003 CDOJ 2005
Notes : Requirements: Population (P), Caseload (C), Electorate (E), Judiciary Buildings, including
prison (B), Revenue (R), Area (A), Police Quarters (Q). Sources: Código de Organização e Divisão
Judiciárias (CODJ), Código Judiciário (CJ), Código de Organização Judiciária (COJ), Lei Orgânica
do Poder Judiciário (LOPJ), Lei de Divisão e Organização Judiciárias (LDOJ).
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Table 2: Judiciary districts in Brazil, 1999 and 2005
State Region 2000 2005 1999 2005 Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Acre N 22 22 14 22 1.00 0.00 1 1
Amapá N 16 16 10 11 1.45 0.52 1 2
Amazonas N 62 62 56 62 1.00 0.00 1 1
Pará N 143 143 96 105 1.36 0.77 1 5
Rondônia N 52 52 20 25 2.08 1.08 1 6
Roraima N 15 15 5 7 2.14 1.07 1 4
Tocantins N 139 139 42 45 3.09 1.61 1 7
Alagoas NE 101 102 63 63 1.61 0.85 1 4
Bahia NE 415 417 268 272 1.53 0.81 1 5
Ceará NE 184 184 137 137 1.34 0.60 1 4
Maranhão NE 217 217 79 125 1.74 0.79 1 5
Paraíba NE 223 223 70 72 3.10 1.73 1 9
Pernambuco NE 185 185 112 148 1.22 0.48 1 3
Piauí NE 221 223 89 97 2.30 1.58 1 9
Rio Grande do Norte NE 166 167 62 65 2.57 1.47 1 7
Sergipe NE 75 75 37 37 2.03 1.09 1 5
Goiás CW 242 246 113 119 2.07 0.97 1 6
Mato Grosso CW 126 141 49 55 2.56 1.45 1 6
Mato Grosso do Sul CW 77 78 45 51 1.53 0.70 1 4
Espírito Santo SE 77 78 68 69 1.13 0.34 1 2
Minas Gerais SE 853 853 282 309 2.76 1.73 1 11
Rio de Janeiro SE 91 92 71 73 1.25 0.55 1 3
São Paulo SE 645 645 228 224 2.88 1.79 1 10
Paraná S 399 399 156 155 2.57 1.33 1 6
Rio Grande do Sul S 467 496 157 162 3.06 2.06 1 14
Santa Catarina S 293 293 86 97 3.01 1.65 1 8
Brazil 5.506 5.563 2.415 2.607 2.13 1.47 1 14
Counties per District 2005# of Districts# of Counties
Notes : The source for judiciary districts in 1999 is a nationwide survey administered by the
statistical institute IBGE. For 2005 the sources are the Códigos de Organização e Divisão Judiciárias
of each state as detailed in Table 1.
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Table 3: Summary statistics and covariate balance
Comparison by judiciary
seat status
Comparison by population rank within
judiciary district
Non-seat
(1)
Diff.
(2)
Not-top
(3)
Diff.
(4)
Adj. Diff.
(5)
Municipality population (,000) 7.82 10.53*** 7.72 10.76*** 0.12
[5.85] (0.65) [5.91] (0.63) (0.08)
Judiciary district population (,000) 71.59 -40.60*** 71.62 -40.37*** -77.11***
[116.80] (5.46) [117.03] (5.49) (16.89)
Income per capita 155.50 22.49*** 156.88 18.20*** 13.97***
[81.80] (6.95) [81.55] (6.98) (5.22)
Average years of schooling 3.75 0.47*** 3.78 0.38*** 0.35***
[1.11] (0.09) [1.11] (0.09) (0.07)
Proportion living in urban areas 0.52 0.14*** 0.53 0.12*** 0.06***
[0.23] (0.02) [0.23] (0.02) (0.02)
Income Gini coefficient 0.55 0.02*** 0.55 0.02*** 0.01
[0.06] (0.00) [0.06] (0.00) (0.01)
Size of electorate (,000) 5.32 6.94*** 5.29 6.96*** 0.50***
[3.54] (0.42) [3.65] (0.41) (0.17)
Turnout 0.88 -0.02*** 0.88 -0.02*** 0.01
[0.06] (0.00) [0.06] (0.00) (0.01)
Mayor age 48.60 1.41** 48.88 0.55 -1.19
[9.38] (0.69) [9.38] (0.69) (1.02)
First-term mayor 0.59 0.04 0.58 0.05 0.07
[0.49] (0.04) [0.49] (0.04) (0.05)
Distance to state capital (km) 267.82 -10.43 266.46 -6.30 43.90***
[163.95] (12.24) [162.64] (12.34) (16.16)
Radio station 0.26 0.39*** 0.26 0.37*** 0.17***
[0.44] (0.04) [0.44] (0.04) (0.05)
Internet access 0.08 0.28*** 0.07 0.30*** 0.13***
[0.27] (0.03) [0.25] (0.03) (0.04)
Number of municipal civil servants 274.84 279.36*** 272.60 283.70*** 26.90*
[192.24] (22.68) [189.13] (22.54) (14.49)
Digital record of municipal assets 0.48 -0.01 0.47 -0.01 0.06
[0.50] (0.04) [0.50] (0.04) (0.05)
Computerized accounting 0.86 0.02 0.87 0.00 -0.01
[0.34] (0.03) [0.34] (0.03) (0.03)
Computerized budget execution 0.77 0.03 0.78 -0.01 -0.03
[0.42] (0.03) [0.41] (0.03) (0.04)
Own revenue per capita 49.27 -23.62*** 46.43 -14.99** -19.29
[136.16] (6.67) [130.19] (7.46) (12.19)
Federal transfers per capita 485.35 -256.59** 481.97 -244.44** -45.77
[2,355.07] (107.64) [2,359.50] (108.23) (75.41)
State transfers per capita 239.78 -101.85*** 233.23 -81.56*** -13.43
[541.79] (25.81) [538.12] (26.67) (25.30)
Total spending per capita 835.68 -402.83*** 820.55 -354.62*** -72.66
[2,892.09] (132.70) [2,892.50] (134.33) (101.06)
Notes: OLS estimations based on 721 municipalities that were audited through round 21, excluding single-municipality
judiciary districts, as well as municipalities with population above 40,000. Variables are measured in 2000. Columns (1)
and (3) show sample means and in brackets standard deviations for non-judiciary seat and not-top-ranked municipalities,
respectively. Columns (2) and (4) show the corresponding difference in mean estimates compared to judiciary seat and
top-ranked municipalities, respectively. Column (5) shows the adjusted difference estimate that controls for state fixed
effects and dummies for population within bins of width 2,500. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
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9 Appendix I
Corruption codingsa
Auditor classification of irregularities % LZ FF BNPT
Civil society oversight of government programs 4.97
- non-existent civil society council 10.32 P
- ineffective/non-existent oversight 70.93 P
- irregular composition of oversight council 9.94 P
- evidence of council capture by mayor 1.33 P
- no meeting records 0.35 P
- formal errors 7.13 P
Quality and timeliness of financial reporting 12.88
- irregular/non-existent financial report 66.34 P
- irregular/non-existent receipts 29.04 P Cb M
- delayed reporting 4.62 P
Financial program and project management 3.58
- emission of checks without justification 7.88 M/N C
- excess cash holdings (opportunity cost) 43.71 M/N
- unjustified payment of bank fees 1.40 M/N
- irregular account management 36.57 P
- spending without appropriation 4.51 P
- failure to return residual project funds 5.39 P
- premature withdrawal of funds 0.53 P
Procurement for programs and projects 17.86
- unjustified or excessive payments for goods and services 15.99 M/N C C
- simulated tender process 2.56 M/N Cc C
- evidence of favouritism 5.59 M/N Cc C
- fractionalizing of procurement amounts 3.45 M/N C
- invitation for bids to less than three firms 6.54 M/N M M
- procurement modality too restricted 3.86          M/N M
- participating ineligible firm 7.66 M/N M
- non-selection of the lowest bid 1.74 M/N
- evidence of price collusion 0.52 M/N
- unjustified direct purchase (no competition) 6.30 M/N
- irregular composition of the procurement commission 1.60 M/N
- absence of preliminary price survey 5.52 P
- inadequate publication of the call 3.68 P
- incomplete specification of the call 3.28 P
- inadequate publication of results 1.72 P
- tender process without funding 0.06 P
- formal errors 29.92 P
Social security contribution collection 1.74          P
a LZ: Litschig and Zamboni, FF: Ferraz and Finan, BNPT: Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini, P: Procedural, M/N:
Mismanagement/Nonvisible, M/V: Mismanagement/Visible, C: Corruption
b Only if “community members confirm that the goods were in fact not delivered”.
c Only if “the public good was not provided”.
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Auditor classification of irregularities % LZ          FF       BNPT
Execution of programs and capital projects 33.68
- project not implemented 10.08 M/V C
- partial project execution 5.18 M/V C
- substandard project execution 28.22          M/V C
- diversion of project resources 10.51 M/V M          M
- time overruns 0.54 M/V
- project delays 2.17 M/V
- inadequate project inputs 1.84 M/V         M
- project on hold 1.14 M/V
- inadequate infrastructure to run program 5.74 P
- lacking oversight of project implementation 6.20 P
- irregular sub-contracting 0.13 P
- irregular change of work plan 2.20 P
- irregular project documentation 13.07 P
- matching grant requirements not met by local governments 3.26 P
- staff members have inadequate training 4.07 P
- irregular contract 0.51 P
- late payment to suppliers 0.15 P
- failure to notify community of resource receipt 3.01 P
- formal errors 1.71 P
Inventory and equipment management 13.56
- inventory or equipment unaccounted for 49.43 M/V
- irregular sale of inventory or equipment 1.28 M/V
- unusable or only partially usable inventory or equipment 6.91 M/V
- non-existent equipment utilization control 4.26 P
- non-existent inventory control 15.31 P
- inadequate equipment/inventory maintenance 12.90 P M
- inappropriate use of equipment 4.26 P
- inappropriate political propaganda 0.42 P
- equipment without appropriate label 5.23 P
Remittance management 10.26
- irregular fees/other requirements to obtain benefits 6.04 M/V
- remittance to ineligible individuals 17.84 M/V
- benefit not remitted                                                                           4.65          M/V
- partial remittance 1.06 M/V
- delayed remittances 5.17 M/V
- duplication of remittance 5.00 M/N
- program beneficiary not found 10.34 M/N
- non-existent school attendance verification 7.27 M/N M
- number of beneficiaries below target 2.83 M/N
- irregularities in the payment process 5.34 P
- incomplete register of beneficiaries 33.32 P
- costly access to obtain benefits 1.10 P
- formal errors 0.03 P
Other irregularities 1.46
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1 Details on alternative corruption codings
This section describes alternative codings of CGU auditors’ classification of irregularities in more
detail. In addition to our own coding, we discuss those by Ferraz and Finan (FF, 2011), and Brollo,
Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (BNPT, 2013). Please refer to appendix I of the paper for the
discussion below.
Ferraz and Finan define a corruption and a mismanagement measure, which essentially corre-
spond to mutually exclusive subsets of our management irregularities. Importantly however, they
argue that corruption irregularities are potentially observed by voters, while management irregular-
ities are not. Our own assessment is often somewhat different. For example, one of the corruption
categories in Ferraz and Finan, which they call "diversion of funds" is when funds "disappear from
municipal bank accounts", which might roughly correspond to our "emission of checks without
justification" type of irregularity, which we consider nonvisible to voters. Another instance of "di-
version of funds" they consider is when "the municipality claimed to have purchased goods and
services that were never provided, which is determined when there is no proof of purchase and
community members confirm that the goods were in fact not delivered". This corruption category
would correspond to a subset of our "irregular/non-existent receipts" type, for which non-delivery
was somehow confirmed. Since we do not have this information in our data we code "irregular/non-
existent receipts" as a procedural irregularity. Other examples of "diversion of funds" include the
partial construction of roads and classrooms, or the construction of dams and wells on politicians’
private farms, which correspond to our "project not implemented", "partial project execution",
"substandard project execution" and "diversion of project resources". We agree with their assess-
ment that these types of irregularities are likely visible to voters. Another type of corruption they
distinguish is "over-invoicing", in which "auditors determined that the goods and services were
purchased at a value above market price", which corresponds to our "unjustified or excessive pay-
ments for goods and services" type. In contrast to Ferraz and Finan’s assessment we consider
this irregularity nonvisible to voters. Finally, their "irregular public procurement", which is when
"there is an illegal call-for-bids where the contract was awarded to a "friendly firm" and "the public
good was not provided" corresponds to a subset of our "simulated tender process" and "evidence of
favoritism" types, where non-provision of the good or service was somehow confirmed. Our own
2
assessment is again that these irregularities are essentially nonvisible to voters, absent revelation
through an external audit.
The mismanagement measure in Ferraz and Finan is based on separate types of irregularities,
which they argue are all not easily observed by voters. In procurement, a mismanagement episode
occurs when "less than three firms bid for a public contract", corresponding to our "invitation for
bids to less than three firms", a nonvisible management irregularity. Other examples are "medi-
cines were not being properly stored", "schools were serving lunches that were past their expiration
dates", or "the mayor’s office was not keeping school attendance for children participating in a fed-
eral school program", which would fall into our "inadequate equipment/inventory maintenance",
and "non-existent school attendance verification" categories, respectively. We agree with their
assessment that these irregularities are hard to detect by voters.
Brollo et al. also use the CGU audit reports to construct a narrow and a broad corruption mea-
sure, both of which basically correspond to a subset of our management irregularities as shown in
appendix I in our paper. Their narrow corruption measure includes cases of "limited competition",
corresponding roughly to our "evidence of favoritism" category, "fraud", corresponding to our
"simulated tender process", and "manipulation of the bid value", which we label "fractionalizing
of procurement amounts". Their narrow definition of corruption also includes cases of "favoritism
in the good receipt", which we do not distinguish in our data, as well as "over-invoicing", which
amounts to our "unjustified or excessive payments for goods and services" category. In their broad
measure of corruption, Brollo et al. include "an irregular firm wins the bid process", correspond-
ing roughly to our "participating ineligible firm", "the minimum number of bids is not attained",
which we label "invitation for bids to less than three firms", as well as "the required procurement
procedure is not executed", which is our "procurement modality too restricted". In their broad
measure of corruption, Brollo et al. also include "diversion of funds", corresponding to our "diver-
sion of project resources", as well as "paid but not proven", which we label "irregular/non-existent
receipts".
Table 1 below shows estimates of the effect of judicial presence on corruption based on the
codings by Ferraz and Finan (2011) and Brollo et al. (2013). Please refer to the paper for details
of the specifications. In Panel A the dependent variable is the share of inspections with at least
3
one corruption irregularity. While all estimates are negative, the magnitudes are of the order of -1
to -2 percentage points and none are statistically different from zero. In contrast, our results for
management irregularities in Panel B of Table 5 in the paper suggest a reduction of about 4 per-
centage points and four out of eight estimates are significant at 5 or 10 percent. This difference in
results comes from the fact that the Ferraz and Finan (2011) coding excludes certain management
irregularities, such as project delays or partial and delayed remittance of cash transfers to eligible
individuals, which do in fact respond to judicial presence. The mean share of inspections with
at least one corruption irregularity is only 0.32, while the corresponding mean for management
irregularities is 0.45.
In Panel B of Table 1 below the dependent variable is the share of inspections with at least
one broad corruption irregularity according to the Brollo et al. coding. Despite its name, this
coding includes even fewer types of irregularities since the mean share affected is only 0.19. In
particular, the Brollo et al. coding excludes any irregularities related to project execution. Results
indicate that judicial presence has zero impact on this corruption measure. This is not surprising,
since their broad corruption measure essentially captures irregularities in procurement, which we
argue are not easily observed by voters and thus are not expected to respond to the presence of the
judiciary apparatus.
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